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Abstracts: This paper investigates whether the investment horizon of institutional 
investors influences sell-side analysts’ target price (TP) accuracy. Especially, I examine 
whether a sell-side analyst compromises TP accuracy on a stock if the stock is held by 
short-term institutional investors since those investors are sensitive to near-term price 
impact from TP issuances and, therefore, are more likely to exert pressures on analysts 
to keep the stock price high. Using a database of analysts’ TPs issued from 1999 to 2013, 
I find that TP error increases as transient institutional investors’ ownership increases, 
but not with the holdings of long-term institutional investors. The market partly 
appreciates the optimistic biases in the analysts’ TP revisions, reacting less favorably to 
a revision if the revision is preceded by the purchase of short-term institutional investors. 
However, the market overreacts in general and corrects itself in subsequent months. 
Overall, empirical results indicate that sell-side analysts and the market identify the 
heterogeneity of institutional investors and react selectively according to institutional 
investors’ investment horizons. 
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Numerous studies have shown that the investment horizon of institutional investors 
plays a crucial role in corporate monitoring by influencing management’s decisions about 
disclosures, M&A, and CEO contracting. It is reasonable that the heterogeneity of institutional 
investors influences not only corporate management but also sell-side analysts because the 
analysts have incentives to cater to the different requests from each type of institutional investor. 
However, studies on sell-side analysts’ behaviors depending on different investment horizons of 
institutional investors are relatively rare. I hypothesize that sell-side analysts issue more 
optimistic opinions on stocks held by short-term institutional investors due to the following two 
reasons. First, short-term institutional investors should care about their near-term exit prices of 
their investment, and thus, are more likely to exert pressures on sell-side analysts to keep the 
stock price high (“fee pressure”). Second, ceteris paribus, short-term investors with high 
portfolio turnover generate greater brokerage commissions, compared to long-term investors. 
Thus, sell-side analysts may compromise the accuracy of their opinions if they can generate 
higher commission revenue from transient institutional investors (“trade generation”) (Gu, Li, 
and Yang, 2013)1. Similar to Gu et al. (2013) and Firth, Lin, Liu and Xuan (2013), this paper 
focuses more on the fee pressure hypothesis than on the trade generation hypothesis because I 
examine a sequence of events starting with the existing holdings of institutional investors and 
subsequent analysts’ target prices (TPs) issuances/revisions.2  
My prediction that sell-side TP error increases with short-term institutional ownership 
                                         
1 Gu, Li, and Yang (2013) explicitly distinguished between “fee pressure hypothesis” and “trade generation 
hypothesis”. Not mutually exclusive, they are distinct because the trade generation hypothesis views analyst 
optimism as a cause of intensified trading while the fee pressure hypothesis views analyst optimism as a consequence 
of the pressure exerted through trade allocations by large investors. 
2 Also, sell-side analysts should be less motivated to be optimistically biased on the stock if the stock is already held 
by institutional investors and, therefore, a potential for additional buying trade is limited.  




is not obvious because an analyst also faces countervailing incentives to issue unbiased TPs, 
with the purpose of building up the reputation of high-quality research with accurate forecasts 
(Hong and Kubik, 2003; Jackson, 2005; Cowen, Groysberg, and Healy 2006; Ljungqvist, Starks, 
Wei, and Yan, 2007). Accordingly, if the rewards from accurate research outweigh the pressures 
to reach optimistic opinions, analysts will choose to provide unbiased TPs, and if not, they will 
forgo forecasting accuracy by giving optimistic calls – in other words, analysts will react 
selectively according to institutional investors’ investment horizons, based on their own cost-
benefit assessments. Also, investment horizons of institutional investors are expected to 
differently influence two competing roles of institutional investors on sell-side analysts’ 
forecasting accuracy – monitor role vs. predator role (Gu et al., 2013). Once short-term 
institutional investors have purchased a stock, they would prefer optimistic analysts to unbiased 
one, since they want the stock price to remain high in order to exit from their investment shortly. 
On the other hand, long-term investors do not have those incentives and would more appreciate 
value-added, unbiased research for accurate follow-ups on current positions. Hence, I predict 
that buy-side pressure on sell-side analysts for an optimistic opinion will be more pronounced 
under the influence of short-term institutional investors. 
Specifically, I examine (1) whether short-term institutional investors increase sell-side 
analysts’ TP errors and (2) whether the market perceives the errors (optimism) within analysts’ 
TPs driven by the pressure from short-term institutional investors. My tests confirm that the 
sell-side analysts’ TP errors are positively associated with the short-term institutional investors’ 
ownership and the market partly recognizes the bias in the analysts’ TPs and react less positively 
to the favorable TPs if short-term institutional investors recently purchased the stock prior to the 
TP issuances.  
Using detail I/B/E/S price targets for 2,710 U.S. firms and the Thomson Financial 
Institutional Holdings (13F) database over the period of 1999-2013, I study the associations 




between institutional investors’ investment horizons and sell-side analysts’ target price accuracy. 
I use TP instead of recommendations or earnings forecasts as a proxy of sell-side analysts’ 
opinions because of the advantage of its continuous nature and direct valuation implications 
(Bradshaw, Brown, and Huang, 2013). My TP accuracy measure is the difference between the 
TP and the stock price at the subsequent TP revision date scaled by the stock price at the TP 
issue date, TPE_rev (Bilinski, Lyssimachou, and Walker, 2013). 
The first part of my empirical analysis investigates whether sell-side TP error has 
positive relationship with the holdings of short-term institutional investors (levels analysis) and 
whether sell-side analyst’s TP error increases following a rise in those investors’ ownership 
(changes analysis). I find that TP error increases as transient institutional investors’ ownership 
increases in both levels and changes analysis, but cannot find a similar result from the 
relationship between TP errors and the ownership of long-term institutional investors. These 
results indicate that sell-side analysts distinguish different types of institutional investors and an 
investment horizon of those investors indeed has a meaningful influence on the sell-side TP’s 
optimism.  
However, previous tests are subject to selection bias since short-term institutional 
investors can proactively choose stocks of which sell-side analysts are likely to issue optimistic 
opinions. To establish the direction of causality, I examined the effect of the decimalization in 
2001 to transient institutional investors’ ownership on sell-side TP error. Decimalization 
enhanced both trading activities and ownership of transient institutional investors by improving 
stock liquidity of actively traded stocks (Fang, Tian, and Tice, 2014). Therefore, I use the 
increase in transient institutional investors’ ownership caused by decimalization as an 
instrument to document that the change in short-term institutional investors’ ownership caused 
analysts’ TP error, not vice versa. 




As the second set of empirical analyses, I examine short-term and long-term market 
reactions to the TP revisions preceded by the purchase of short-term institutional investors. 
These tests are conducted to find whether the market appreciates the optimism in sell-side TPs 
originated from the buy-side pressures. On the three-day window of TP revision dates, the 
market seems to recognize the optimism in analysts’ upward TP revisions, reacting less 
favorably to a revision if the revision is made after the short-term institutional investors’ 
purchase of the stock. However, the market still overreacts in general and corrects itself in 
subsequent months and therefore, short-term institutional investors can benefit from exerting 
influence on sell-side analysts to issue positive opinions on their investments. On the other hand, 
sell-side analysts’ upward revisions associated with preceding long-term institutional investors’ 
purchases do not accompany any market corrections at the revision date or further post-event 
period.  
My paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, my analyses add to the 
stream of literature that investigates the effects of shareholder heterogeneity on sell-side 
analysts’ behavior by providing evidence that sell-side analysts differentiate each type of 
institutional investor according to the investment horizon and react selectively based on the 
investors’ demands. Second, evidence of this paper supports and fine-tunes previous results on 
the post-event abnormal returns of TP revisions (Brav and Lehavy, 2003) and extends them to 
the question of whether the ex-post abnormal returns of TP announcements show different 
patterns when TP revision types (i.e., upward revision, downward revision, and reiteration) are 
further conditioned on short-term institutional investors’ preceding trading directions. Third, I 
also extend the literature on the roles of institutional investors on sell-side analysts’ forecasting 
accuracy3  by better separating two competing roles in influencing analysts’ behavior – 
                                         
3 See Hayes (1998), Irvine (2001), Francis (2004), Jackson (2005), Cowen, et al. (2006), Mehran and Stulz (2007), 
and Agrawal and Chen (2008), for example. 




moderating analysts’ biases as monitors vs. twisting analysts’ opinions as predators (Gu et al., 
2013). Extant literature has provided evidence for both roles, but it is difficult to disentangle the 
two roles since the detailed brokerage commission dataset is not publicly available.4 Despite 
the absence of direct trading commission data, this paper was able to indirectly disentangle the 
two competing roles of institutional investors by dividing institutional investors into subgroups 
according to their investment horizons. The institutional investors’ predator role dominates the 
monitor role when the investment horizon is short, whereas the monitor role stands out when 
they commit to an investing for long run. Fourth, my findings have regulatory implications by 
showing that not all institutional investors act as predators of sell-side analysts. Therefore, it is 
sensible for regulators to focus their efforts on the relationship between short-term institutional 
investors and sell-side brokerage firms. 
This study also has a limitation that can be addressed by future research. Short-term 
institutional investors’ ownership is only a proxy for buy-side fee pressure and the proxy can be 
related to other economic sources such as firm characteristics or trading activities. Therefore, 
despite my attempt to address observable and unobservable confounding factors, I admit that the 
association between TP error and each institutional type could be not solely driven by the fee 
pressure hypothesis.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section Ⅱ discusses prior studies 
and introduces my research questions. Section Ⅲ describes main variables and Section Ⅳ 
                                         
4 Firth et al. (2013) and Gu et al. (2013) are notable exceptions. They utilized unique dataset from China because the 
China Securities Regulatory Commission mandatorily requires each mutual fund to publicly report its stockholdings 
and trading commission payment details, including the total amount and distribution of commission s among 
brokerage firms (Firth et al., 2013). However, my paper differs from their studies in the following important ways. 
First, institutional investors’ investment horizon and the investors’ business relation with brokerage firm are disparate 
classification. For example, even though an institutional investor is a client of sell-side analysts’ brokerage, if the 
investor has long investment horizon, they would prefer unbiased research from the related sell-side analysts. Second, 
my paper examined accuracy (optimism) of TPs instead of that of recommendations. Third, I used overall 
institutional investors’ ownership data for the U.S. market whereas above two previous papers used trading 
commission data from the Chinese mutual funds. 




outlines the data and sample. Section Ⅴ reports the results of empirical analyses. Finally, I 
conclude in Section Ⅵ. 
  




Ⅱ. RELATED STUDIES AND HYPOTHESES 
1. Institutional investors’ investment horizons 
Institutional investors are not homogeneous and literatures have examined that 
investment horizon of institutional investors influences corporate decisions and information 
intermediaries’ opinions. With regard to corporate decisions, early theoretical works5 have 
highlighted that each institutional investor respectively chooses its priority between monitoring 
and simple trading based on its cost-benefit framework and, thus, as shown in rich empirical 
studies6, only long-term institutional investors exerts an influence on firms’ decisions on M&As, 
R&D investments, and CEO contracts (Chen, Harford and Li, 2007).  
Regarding the influences of heterogeneous institutional investors on sell-side analysts, 
studies have examined institutional investors have two countervailing roles for sell-side analysts. 
First, previous studies have found that institutional investors demand value-added (unbiased) 
research from sell-side analysts (Cowen et al., 2006; Ljungqvist et al., 2007). On the other hand, 
other studies provided evidence that institutional investors put pressure on the sell-side analysts 
to issue positive research and to refrain from offering negative opinions on the securities that 
they hold (Firth et al. 2012; and Gu et al. 2013). Given the existence of these two contradicting 
roles of institutional investors, this study tries to examine whether institutional investors choose 
their role between monitoring and simple trading based on their investment horizon, accordingly 
influencing analysts’ choice between optimism and accuracy.  
2. Sell-side analysts’ responses to the heterogeneity of institutional investors 
                                         
5 See Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Maug (1998), and Kahn and Winton (1998), for example. 
6 See Brickley, Lease, and Smith (1988), Agrawal and Mandelker (1990), Bushee (1998), Hartzell and Starks (2003), 
Almazan, Hartzell, and Starks (2005), Gasper, Massa and Matos (2005), and Borokhovich, Brunarski, Harman, and 
Parrino, (2006), for example. 




Previous studies have found that sell-side analysts distinguish and respond differently 
to a specific type of institutional investors. One stream of this research examined the relations 
between institutional investors and brokerage firms by categorizing the institutional investors 
into affiliated group and independent unaffiliated one. Mola and Guidolin (2009) found that 
sell-side analysts are likely to assign more frequent and favorable recommendations to a stock 
after the analysts’ affiliated mutual funds invest in that stock because the family affiliation 
provides analysts with a further incentive to promptly issue reports with positive prospects on 
stocks held by affiliated mutual funds and to reluctantly release those with negative prospects. 
On the other hand, Irvine, Simko, and Nathan (2004) showed that affiliated analysts’ earnings 
forecasts are more accurate than the other analysts’ forecasts since affiliated mutual funds 
provide additional information for the affiliated analysts and demand high-quality research from 
them. I conjecture that this mixed evidence from the previous research might results from the 
lack of consideration of investment horizon of affiliated mutual funds. 
Another stream of research classified institutional investors into client and non-client 
group for a brokerage and investigated whether a certain type of institutional investors gives a 
pressure on sell-side analysts to bias their opinions. Thanks to the direct trade commission data 
from China, recent literatures could test the respective reactions of sell-side analysts according 
to their client relationship. Firth et al. (2012) and Gu et al. (2013) found that sell-side analysts 
are more optimistic on their stock recommendations when the stock is held by their clients. 
Therefore, sell-side analysts perceive different types of institutional investors and react 
selectively to each of them. In this study, I explore another dimension of investor heterogeneity, 
institutional investors’ investment horizon and expect the study to fill the void in previous 
research. 
3. Sell-side analysts’ target prices 




In this section, I first review previous literature on the informativeness of analysts’ TPs 
and then summarize studies on the sell-side TP accuracy.  
Bradshaw (2002) found that sell-side analysts use TP as a rationale for their 
recommendations in over two-thirds of the 103 sample sell-side reports, and showed higher TPs 
are associated with more favorable stock recommendations. Although Bradshaw (2002) focused 
on the role of TPs as a justification tool for analysts’ recommendations, subsequent studies 
further discovered independent informativeness of TPs beyond that of recommendations or 
earnings forecasts. Using analysts’ target prices issued over period 1997-1999, Brav and Lehavy 
(2003) examined short-term market reaction to TP revisions and long-term comovement of TP 
and stock prices and found analysts’ TPs are informative both unconditionally and conditional 
on contemporaneously issued stock recommendation and earnings forecasts revisions. Asquith, 
Mikhail, and Au (2005) used a database constructed from analyst reports issued by Institutional 
Investor All-American team members during 1997-1999, and they also found that TP revisions 
provide independent information to the capital market and incorporating them dramatically 
increases the fit of the regression results over that obtained from earnings forecast revisions and 
discrete recommendations alone. Bradshaw et al. (2013) confirmed the previous findings, 
providing evidence of significant market reactions to analysts’ TP revisions after controlling for 
revisions in their earnings forecasts and stock recommendations over the 10 years from 1999 
through 2009. 
Prior studies have employed diverse measures of TP accuracy. Asquith et al. (2005) 
examined a ‘TP attainability’ to measure the accuracy of TPs, considering TPs to be accurate if 
the firm’s stock price equals the 12-month projected price at any time during the year following 
the release of a report, and they found approximately 54% of analysts’ TPs are achieved. 
Bradshaw et al. (2013) investigated analysts’ TP performance of 12-month-ahead target price 
forecasts by utilizing several TP accuracy measures: within-analyst rank correlation, TP forecast 




error, and TP attainability. They have provided statistically significant but economically weak 
evidence of persistent differential abilities by sell-side analysts to forecast TPs. Gleason, 
Johnson, and Li (2013) investigated the influence of inferred valuation model use on the 
investment performance of sell-side analysts’ TPs and documented that substantial 
improvements in TP quality occur when analysts appear to be using a residual-income valuation 
technique rather than a PEG valuation heuristic. In their empirical analyses with 750,000 TPs 
issued from 1997 through 2003, they depart from earlier emphasis on price target attainability 
and instead use a 12-month ex-post buy-and-hold return as TP accuracy measure. Finally, 
Bilinski et al. (2013) provided the evidence of TP accuracy in an international setting. Using an 
international sample of 16 countries, this paper examined analyst- and country-specific 
determinants of TP forecast errors, and found that significant variation in average TP accuracy 
across countries is due to differences in accounting disclosure quality, the origin of the legal 
system, cultural traits, and IFRS regulation.




Ⅲ. VARIABLE DESCRIPTIONS 
1. TP accuracy 
I use TP instead of recommendation or earnings forecast as a proxy of sell-side 
analysts’ opinion, because (1) incorporating gradations in the analysts’ TPs can overcome many 
of the disadvantages of limited, discrete recommendation categories (Asquith et al. 2005); (2) 
contrary to earnings forecasts which only covers short-term limited period, TPs reflect 
permanent nature of company’s earnings (Bradshaw et al., 2013); and (3) TPs are often 
computed as the product of forecasted earnings and a financial ratio, providing incremental 
information beyond earnings forecasts (Asquith et al., 2002; and Brav and Lehavy, 2003).  
Following Bilinski, Lyssimachou, and Walker (2013), I measure TP accuracy by the 
magnitude of TP error, TPE_rev, which is the difference between the TP and the stock price at 
the TP revision date, Prev, scaled by the stock price at the TP issue date, Ps. Although Bilinski et 
al. (2013) used absolute difference, this paper adopted signed difference to get implications of 
optimism as well as accuracy of TP.7 
   _   =
  −     
  
 
In addition to absolute TPE_rev, Bilinski et al. (2013) used another TP error measure, 
TPE, the absolute difference between the target price and the actual stock price at the end of 12-
month forecast horizon scaled by the stock price at the TP issue date since the forecast horizon 
of most TPs is 12 months. However, I used only TPE_rev as a main TP error measure, because 
(1) a revision in target price made before the end of 12-month forecast horizon means that the 
                                         
7 My TP accuracy measure, TPE_rev, indicates analysts’ ex-post optimism because the variable compares stock price 
at TP revision date (Prev) with previous TP, looking backward. Untabulated findings reveals that inferences based on 
estimating my baseline model (both level and change analyses) using ex-ante optimism measure (TP/Ps) are largely 
the same as those based on my main dependent variable, TPE_rev.  




preceding TP becomes obsolete (Bilinski et al. 2013) and (2) for my sample, median interval for 
target price forecast revision is 91 days, much shorter than stated forecast horizon of 12 
months.8 Therefore, I believe 12-month horizon TPE used in Bilinski et al (2013) is not an 
appropriate measure of TP accuracy at least for this paper’s empirical tests. 
2. Institutional investors’ investment horizons 
Main explanatory variable of my empirical analyses is institutional investors’ investment 
horizon and I adopted Bushee’s (1998, 2001) methodology of institutional investor 
classification. He developed an algorithm to decompose institutional investors into three groups 
by diversification of investment position and trading frequency for an institution: (1) the 
transient investors with high turnover and highly diversified positions; (2) the dedicated investor 
with low turnover and high concentration of their holdings; and (3) quasi-indexing investors 
with low turnover and high diversification. Therefore, according to Bushee’s classification, 
transient investors hold their investments for short horizon whereas dedicated investors and 
quasi-indexers maintain their positions for longer periods. Hence, I use three types of 
institutional investor as the proxy for institutional investors’ investment horizon. Institutional 
investors’ ownership data at the end of quarter q-1 are matched to subsequent TPs issued during 
quarter q as shown in Figure 1. 
3. Control variables 
I include a series of control variables in my model to capture previously documented 
determinants of TP accuracy. I mainly followed Bilinski et al. (2013) and Bradshaw et al. (2013) 
in selecting control variables9: covered firm characteristics, analyst/broker characteristics, and 
                                         
8 This sample descriptive is consistent with Bradshow, Huang, and Tan (2012). Due to this shorter-than-expected 
observed revision frequency, they also chose six-month as primary TP horizon. 
9 Bilinski et al. (2013) also included TP/P ratio and EPS forecast error (aEPS) to control for a firm’s high expected 




others. The covered firm characteristics include firm market capitalization (MV) and the number 
of analysts following a firm (F_#Ana) as measures for information environment of a firm. 
Bilinski et al. (2013) showed that both variables have negative associations with TP error 
because analysts produce more accurate forecasts for firms with abundant information 
environment and high competition among analysts. Price momentum (MOM) controls for 
predictable price patterns. Jegadeesh, Kim, Krische, and Lee (2004) found that analyst’s 
recommendation profitability is positively associated with past momentum, and Bilinski et al. 
(2013) and Bradshaw et al. (2013) also showed that past price momentum decreases sell-side TP 
errors. Stock price volatility (VOL) is included to capture the level of difficulty to predict a 
firm’s future price, and I expect the sign of the coefficient of VOL to be positive. I also included 
stock turnover (TURN), average daily stock turnover for 3 months prior to the TP issue date, to 
control for the general trade generation incentive of sell-side analysts. Since numerous previous 
studies have shown significantly positive relations between trading commission and analysts’ 
optimism, TURN variable is predicted to be positively related to the TP errors (O’Brien and 
Bhushan, 1990; McNichols and O’Brien, 1997; Jackson, 2005; and Agrawal and Chen, 2008). 
Note that a significant association between TP error and the each institutional investor’s 
ownership after controlling for stock turnover indicates a sell-side analyst distinguishes each 
institutional investor’ investment horizon and reacts selectively, a behavior distinct from chasing 
actively-traded stocks for trade generation. Additionally, I included a firm’s past financial 
performance measures since analysts use past information to develop their TPs. I control for 
past firm characteristics for quarter q-1, including profitability (ROA), loss dummy (LOSS), 
                                                                                                                       
earnings growth and analysts’ differential ability to issue accurate target price beyond the ability to forecast accurate 
earnings, respectively. However, I do not use these variables since their inclusion would distract from my research 
objectives. First of all, including TP/P ratio might distort the test since it is mechanically associated with dependent 
variable, TPE_rev, by definition of the variable. Instead of TP/P, I additionally include market-to-book ratio in the 
regression model to capture expected earnings growth of a firm. Secondly, in this paper, aEPS should not be included 
in the model because I use TP error as an aggregate measure of analyst’s opinion, not incremental information beyond 
earnings forecast.  




leverage (LEV), and market-to-book ratio (MTB).  
The analyst and broker characteristics I control for include an analyst’s firm-specific 
experience (A_exp), number of firms that an analyst is following (A_cover), and the number of 
analysts at a brokerage house (B_#Ana). Previous studies have shown that experienced analysts 
predict covered firms’ future price (TP) as well as EPS more accurately (Mikhail, Walther, and 
Willis, 1997; Clement 1999; Jacob, Lys, and Neale 1999; and Bilinski et al. 2013). However, the 
influence on TP error of the number of an analyst’s coverage firms is somewhat mixed. 
Although Clement (1999) and Jacob et al. (1999) found that effort constraints and diffusion of 
focus cause analysts to increase forecast errors, it is also possible that an analyst can obtain 
additional information by covering more companies and produce more accurate forecasts as 
shown in Bollinger (2004). Therefore, I have no expectation for the sign of the coefficient of 
A_cover. Finally, the number of analysts at a brokerage house (B_#Ana) captures the size of 
research resource that an analyst can utilize, and Clement (1999) and Jacob et al. (1999) found 
the positive association between the brokerage size and forecast accuracy of the analysts in the 
brokerage. 
In addition, I include dummy variable for financial crisis period (Fin_cris) because 
drastic share price change around the period distorts my dependent variable, TPE_rev. To 
control for time and industry effects, I also include a set of annual dummies (Year dummies) for 
the TP issue year and ten industry dummies (Industry dummies) based on the sector code from 
the GICS classification in all regression models. Table 1 provides detailed variable definitions.  
  




Ⅳ. DATA AND SAMPLE 
The data used in this study are mainly obtained from four sources: Thomson Reuters’s 
I/B/E/S, CRSP, Compustat, and Thomson Financial Institutional Holdings (13F) database. My 
sample period is from the first quarter of 1999 to the fourth quarter of 2013. I collect the each 
analyst’s target prices and EPS estimates for firms listed on NYSE, AMEX and Nasdaq from the 
I/B/E/S detail U.S files and daily stock prices, returns, traded volume, and the number of shares 
outstanding from CRSP. I delete firms whose stock price is missing or less than 5 dollars. I 
obtained quarterly financial data of covered firms from Compustat database. Following 
Bushee’s (1998, 2001) classification, I break down institutional holdings from 13F into three 
groups. Each TP issued in quarter q (firm-analyst observations) is merged with the firm’s 
financial and ownership data at the end of quarter q-1. To minimize the effect of outliers, I 
delete all continuous variables at the top and bottom 1% of each variable’s distribution. My final 
sample includes 206,285 TPs for 2,710 firms issued by 6,417 analysts, and each unit of 
observation is a single analyst TP.  
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics for the dependent and explanatory variables. 
As previous studies have founded, sell-side analysts are generally optimistic – mean TP error 
(TPE_rev) is 14%. The summary statistics for analyst characteristics are mostly similar with 
Bilinski et al. (2013), confirming our sample is not special. The average firm-specific 
forecasting experience is 3.18 years and an analyst covers average 16.42 firms at the same time. 
Approximately 61 analysts are employed at one brokerage house on average during my sample 
period. 
Table 3 presents Pearson and Spearman rank correlations between our main baseline 
variables. The ownership of transient institutional investors, TII, has a significantly positive 
Pearson (Spearman) correlation with turnover measure, consistent with Bushee’s identification 




of transient investors. The number of analysts following, F_#Ann also has a significant positive 
Pearson (Spearman) correlation with TURN, suggesting that actively-traded stocks attract more 
sell-side analysts or sell-side analyst following generates more turnovers for covered stocks. 
  




Ⅴ. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 I first investigate whether analyst’s TP error increases with transient institutional 
investor’s ownership and whether the same relation exits for the ownership of dedicated and 
quasi-indexing institutional investors. To address reverse causality of my first analyses, I exploit 
external shock of liquidity at decimalization and establish causal effect of institutional investors’ 
investment horizon on sell-side analysts’ TP accuracy. As a second set of analysis, I examine the 
ex-post market reactions to the sell-side TP revisions, in order to find whether the market 
appreciates the optimistic bias associated with institutional investor’s investment horizon. 
1. Heterogeneous Institutional Investors and Sell-side Analysts’ Target Price Errors 
The baseline models of my first empirical analyses are: 
   _     =   +        +        +        +         +      _#     +        
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where the ln denotes logarithmic transformation of the variable.10 The variables are measured 
                                         
10 For A_exp I use log 1+ corresponding variable to account for zero values. 




for firm i and analyst j. Our empirical tests use robust standard errors clustered by firm and 
analyst (Peterson 2009). 
Table 4 presents how the investment horizon of institutional investors influences 
analysts’ target price accuracy. Column (1) and (2) are results from the estimation of regression 
model (1) where the analysts’ target price errors are regressed on the levels of each type of 
institutional ownership at the end of q-1. Column (3) and (4) are based on the regression model 
(2). Here, I test whether a quarter-on-quarter increase in transient institutional investors’ 
ownership causes a sell-side analyst to produce a more inaccurate (optimistic) TP, compared to 
their previous one for the same covered stock. Since sell-side analysts are likely to face greater 
pressures from short-term institutional investors to maintain optimistic view on the investors’ 
investment, I expect β1 to be significantly positive in both level and change regression models. 
On the other hand, long-term institutional investors, compared to short-term institutional 
investors, will more appreciate unbiased high-quality research; therefore, sell-side analysts 
should have less incentive to please long-term investors with optimistic opinion. Accordingly, I 
predict the magnitude of β2 and β3 to be significantly less than β1 but whether long-term 
investors’ monitor role overwhelms their predator role or not is an empirical question. Hence, I 
do not predict specific signs for the coefficient estimates of dedicated and quasi-indexing 
investors’ ownership. 
Column (2) is my baseline OLS regression model clustered by firm and analyst 
(Peterson, 2009). Consistent with my prediction, the coefficient of TII, β1, is positive and 
significant after controlling for other determinants of analysts’ TP error, indicating that the sell-
side analysts’ TP error increases with the ownership of transient institutional investors’ 
ownership. The result is economically significant since one standard deviation increase of 
transient investors’ ownership would increase sell-side analysts’ TP error by 2.2%pt. On the 
other hand, the coefficient of DED (β2) is insignificant and that of QUS (β3) is significantly 




negative, implying that competing roles of dedicated institutional investors offset themselves 
and in case of quasi-indexers, monitor role dominates predator role of the institutional investors. 
Though there is some difference in the magnitude, both coefficient estimates (β2 and β3) are 
significantly less than β1, confirming my prediction. 
Coefficients of control variables mostly fall in line with my predictions or findings 
from previous studies. The number of analysts covering a firm (F_#Ana) is negatively related to 
analysts’ TP error, suggesting that for firms with rich information environment analysts produce 
more accurate TPs. The size measure, lnMV, shows the opposite sign to my prediction, but 
economic significance of the coefficient is negligible. Similar to the findings from Bilinski et al. 
(2013) and Bradshow et al. (2014), a reversal of price momentum (MOM) decreases TP errors 
and more volatile stocks (VOL) are associated with larger TP errors. Regarding to the proxies of 
analysts/broker characteristics, the coefficient of B_#Ana shows that analysts produce more 
accurate TPs when they have superior research resources. Insignificant coefficient of the 
number of an analysts’ coverage firms (A_cover) seems to reflect the mixed evidence from 
previous research (Clement, 1999; Jacob et al., 1999; Bollinger, 2004). However, I cannot find 
the explanation for the significantly positive association between analysts’ experience (A_exp) 
and TP error. 
To test the robustness of findings from level analysis of regression model (1), I tested 
my baseline model using change variables, controlling for time-invariant unobservable omitted 
variables. Dependent variable of change analysis is the change in TP errors (△TPE_rev) of the 
same analyst for the same covered stock. The number of sample observations used for this 
change analysis is 165,384. Results are qualitatively similar to the level analysis, and 
explanatory power of the change model is even higher than previous level model. Results in 
column (4) show that an increase in transient investor’s ownership leads to larger TP error (more 
optimistic TP). The coefficient estimate of △TII means that 1% ownership increase of transient 




institutional investors are associated with subsequent 3.12%pt increase in sell-side analysts’ TP 
error. However, the increase in long-term institutional investors does not increase analysts’ TP 
error, suggesting that sell-side analysts selectively react to the ownership changes of 
heterogeneous institutional investors. The sign and significance of coefficients of control 
variables in the change analysis are mostly similar to those in the level analysis. To sum, results 
from level and change analyses support my hypothesis that sell-side analysts distinguish 
institutional investors with different investment horizon and that investment horizon indeed 
exerts a significant influence on the analysts’ optimism.  
2. Reverse Causality 
Although the prior empirical analyses support my hypothesis that stock holdings of 
short-term institutional investors make sell-side analysts compromise their TP accuracy to cater 
for those investors. However, the findings are also subject to alternative explanation that short-
term institutional investors may selectively choose the stocks that sell-side analysts are likely to 
issue inaccurate (optimistic) TPs – i.e. stocks with poor information and high return volatility. 
To address this reverse causality, I use the change of liquidity caused by the exogenous shock of 
decimalization to identify causal effect of transient institutional investors’ ownership on sell-
side analysts’ opinion.  
Bushee (2004) argued that transient institutions prefer greater liquidity because it 
allows them to move in and out of stocks without having their trading profits eroded by round-
trip transaction costs. Since decimalization significantly increase liquidity of the market, 
especially actively traded stocks (Bessembinder, 2003; Furfine, 2003), it is reasonably expected 
that decimalization positively influences the activities of transient institutional investors. In fact, 
Fang et al. (2014) directly examined this impact of liquidity change on institutional investors. 
Using difference-in-difference test for three-year window before and after the decimalization in 




2001, they found that an exogenous increase in stock liquidity increases the holdings by non-
dedicated institutional investors. Therefore, I use the change of liquidity caused by 
decimalization as an instrument because the decimalization increases the transient investors’ 
ownership but do not directly affect analyst’s TP accuracies.  
Decimalization has been often used as an exogenous shock to liquidity by previous 
scholars. Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2008) used the decimalization to show that 
increases of liquidity improve market efficiency and Fang, Noe, and Tice (2009) studied 
decimalization to establish a causal effect of liquidity on firm performance. Also, Fang et al. 
(2014) showed that an increase in liquidity from decimalization causes a reduction in future 
innovation. Here, I followed Fang et al. (2009)’s approach to identify casual relations between 
transient investor’s ownership and sell-side analysts’ TP accuracy.11 
The NYSE and Amex began trading all listed stocks in decimals on January 29, 2001 
and Nasdaq did over the interval of March 12, 2001 to April 9, 2001. Therefore, I regress the 
change in TP error surrounding decimalization on the change in transient institutional investors’ 
ownership from the second half of 2000 to the second half of 2001. To be included in the sample, 
the same analyst should issue TPs on the same covered stock before and after the decimalization 
and I winsorized top and bottom 1% of each continuous variables. Finally, 319 observations are 
used to this analysis. The regression model is: 
                                         
11 Fang et al. (2009) used the change in variables from the fiscal year prior to decimalization (t-1) to the fiscal year 
after decimalization (t+1). However, I use shorter test window, from second-half of 2000 to first-half of 2001, in 
order to better control changes of omitted firm fundamental variables. 
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where t is the a calendar year from January 1, 2001 to June 31, 2001 which decimalization 
occurred. The variables are measured for firm i and analyst j. Regression (3) is estimated using 
OLS procedures and the test uses robust standard errors clustered by firm and analyst (Peterson, 
2009). The coefficient of △TII, γ1, is the interested variable and I expect the variable to be 
significantly positive because the increase of transient institutional investors’ ownership driven 
by decimalization should lead to more optimistic TPs from sell-side analysts. 
The results are presented in Table 5. The increased transient institutional investors’ 
ownership around decimalization resulted in larger sell-side analyst’s optimism. Consistent with 
the results of Fang et al. (2014), holdings of both transient and quasi-indexing institutional 
investors significantly increased after decimalization in my sample12, but it is notable that the 
change of quasi-indexer’s ownership does not have an association with the change of analysts’ 
TP accuracy. Therefore, this quasi-experimental analysis addresses reverse causality issue of 
previous analyses, strengthening my main hypothesis that sell-side analysts dynamically react to 
the ownership changes of different type of institutional investors. 
                                         
12 Untabulated due to space constraints 




3. Postevent Market Reactions Associated with Sell-side Analyst Target Price Revisions 
In this section, I investigate value implications of analyst TP revisions, differentiating 
TP revisions made following transient investor ownership changes. From the previous tests, I 
presented that analyst TPs are optimistically biased due to the pressure from short-term 
investors, but whether the market properly adjusts for such bias is another question. I first 
analyze short-term market reactions upon the TP revision date and then examine long-term 
stock returns after the revisions. 
Brav and Lehavy (2003) presented that TP revisions are incrementally informative, 
both unconditionally and conditional on stock recommendation and earnings forecast revisions. 
Following Brav and Lehavy (2003), I computed cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) as the 
difference between a firms’ buy-and-hold return and the buy-and-hold return on the 
NYSE/AMEX/Nasdaq value-weighted market index over the period of -1 to +1 days around TP 
revision date. Then, I used the CARs into the following regression model modified from Gu et 
al. (2013) and Lin and McNichols (1998): 
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where CAR is the cumulative market-adjusted returns around the date of the TP revision (day 0) 
over trading-day window (-1, +1). When testing long-term ex-post buy-and-hold abnormal 
returns, I used (0, +60) and (0, +90) trading windows. UP, REIT, and DOWN refer to indicator 
variables of upward revisions, reiteration, and downward revisions. Note that ownership 




changes of each institutional investor (∆TII, ∆DED, ∆QUS) precede analysts’ TP revision. The 
variables are measured for firm i and analyst j. 
Short-term stock returns upon analyst TP revision 
I am mainly interested in the coefficient estimates of interactions of upward revision 
(UP) and transient ownership change (∆TII), δ4. If the market appreciates the optimism in sell-
side analysts’ TPs driven by the preceding purchase of transient institutional investors, the sign 
of δ4 should be significantly negative. If the market completely adjusts for the bias, then 
analysts will not have the incentive for the optimistic bias and there is no need for transient 
institutional investor to pressure analysts with regard to TPs. Since sell-side analysts’ TPs are 
not positively biased by the ownership change of long-term institutional investors, I do not 
expect the signs of δ7 or δ10 to be significantly negative.  
Predicting signs for interaction terms with downward revision (δ6) is not 
straightforward since countervailing forces exist with regard to downward revisions. Negative 
sell-side opinion despite transient institutional ownership may deliver more negative signals to 
the market and create damaging price effects upon revision date, suggesting negative signs for 
δ6. On the other hand, the explicit extent of downward TP revision can be smaller when 
transient institutional investors have increased their ownership on the stock because sell-side 
analysts would not want to displease those investors. For example, sell-side analysts might 
reduce downward magnitude from original 10% to 5% if the covered stock is newly purchased 
by institutional investors. If this is the case, the signs for δ6 will be positive. Therefore, I have no 
prediction for the signs of δ6. 
Columns (1) of Table 6 show OLS regression results using average three-day CARs at 
TP revision date as a dependent variable. Results are mostly consistent with my prediction. The 
coefficients on UP, REIT, and DOWN show that sell-side analysts’ TP revisions have a 




significant impact on stock returns. The interactions of upward revision (UP) and the change of 
transient ownership (∆TII) is significantly negative, suggesting that the market discounts 
favorable TPs of sell-side analysts if the opinion is followed by the increase of transient 
holdings. It is interesting that the interaction of UP and ∆QUS (δ10) is significantly positive, 
meaning that the investment of quasi-indexing institutional investors gives more credibility to 
the analysts’ upward TP revisions. Finally, the interactions of downward revision (DOWN) and 
the change of transient ownership (∆TII) is significant and positive, and I conjecture the result is 
driven by less negative extent of TP revisions from sell-side analysts under the existence of 
transient institutional investors. 
Long-term stock returns following analyst TP revision  
I also study the stock performance subsequent to the TP revision date, measured by 
market-adjusted CAR over the three months and six months as shown in column (2) and (3). I 
do not examine stock returns for longer horizon since almost three fourth of my sample 
observations is revised within 6 months after TP issuance date.  
The long-term returns of the covered stocks following the analyst TP revisions are 
qualitatively similar to the short-term market reactions on the TP revision date. The coefficient 
of on UP*∆TII (δ4) is significantly negative in both column (2) and (3), again supporting that 
optimism in sell-side analysts’ upward TP revisions following short-term institutional investors’ 
purchases are partly corrected for postevent period. This is consistent with Brav and Lehavy 
(2003)’s finding of postevent drifts following TP revisions and also analogous to the results 
from Gu et al. (2013) which have shown that favorable recommendations of affiliated analysts 
are followed by worse subsequent stock performance compared to the recommendation of 
unaffiliated analyst. Similar to the result in column (1), previous ownership changes of long-
term institutional investors do not present significant variation of long-term stock returns of the 




covered stocks.  
 Although the evidence reported in Table 6 suggests that it takes a while for the market 
to reflect the bias in sell-side TPs into the stock prices, I run calendar-time portfolio analysis 
(Fama, 1998) to directly examine long-term postevent cumulative abnormal returns. I followed 
the approach applied by Brav and Lehavy (2003)13 which shows how the information regarding 
future abnormal returns that TP contains varies across previous ownership change of transient 
institutional investors. The test is performed by constructing portfolio that includes all TP 
revisions that are announced within previous six months and each TP revision is matched with 
the transient institutional investors’ ownership change in previous quarter. I first classified the 
sample into three groups: TP upward revisions, reiterations, and downward revisions, and then 
sorted each group in decile (tercile)14 by the magnitude of the ownership changes from transient 
institutional investors. The equal-weighted portfolio returns in excess of risk-free rate are 
examined by Carhart (1997) four-factor model and I present estimated alphas and factor 
loadings. The regression model is given by 
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and I focus on the inference of the magnitude and significance of the intercept, α. This analysis 
fine-tunes Brav and Lehavy (2003)’s result on postevent abnormal returns of TP revisions and 
extends it to the question of whether the ex-post abnormal returns of TP announcement show 
different patterns when TP revision types are further conditioned on preceding short-term 
institutional investors’ trading direction. 
                                         
13 Brav and Lehavy (2003) performed this additional test to address methodological concerns raised by Fama (1998) 
and Barber and Lyon (1997).  
14 For the reiteration category, I report estimates for the highest and lowest tercile portfolios, since the number of 
observations in this case is less than the portfolios in upward and downward revision categories. 




 Table 7 presents regression results for monthly portfolios dependently sorted on TP 
revisions types and preceding transient ownership changes. The result on unconditioned TP 
revision categories confirms the findings of Brav and Lehavy (2003), providing evidence that 
only upward TP revision portfolio has a significant portfolio intercept of 0.241 percent. 
Interestingly, when conditioned on transient investors’ ownership changes within a TP upward 
revision category, the alpha for the highest decile portfolio loses its significance whereas the 
lowest decile portfolio maintains its economically and statistically large portfolio intercept, 
0.559 percent. This result implies that the sell-side TP upward revision varies considerably in 
the information it contains regarding ex-post abnormal returns according to the preceding 
trading patterns of short-term institutional investors. When decile portfolios are differently 
constructed by preceding long-term institutional ownership changes, any meaningful difference 
in postevent abnormal returns between the highest and lowest decile is not founded (in 
untabulated results).  
Overall, the results in Table 6 and Table 7 indicate that, when the analysts’ TPs are 
issued, the market recognizes and discounts the optimistic bias associated with the pressure 
from short-term institutional investors. However, the market still overreacts in general and 
corrects itself in subsequent months. Therefore, short-term institutional investors can benefit 
from forcing sell-side analysts to issue positive opinion on their investments.  
  





The empirical analyses so far support that there are dynamic interactions between sell-
side analysts and heterogeneous institutional investors’ investment horizon and the sell-side 
analysts try to provide customized service to meet the specific demands from each type of 
institutional investor. First, this study documents that TP error increases as transient institutional 
investors’ ownership increases. Second, my test established causal relations between analyst’s 
TP errors and institutional investors’ investment. Third, I also find that even though the market 
discount sell-side TP’s optimism at its issuance, it still overreact to the favorable opinion, 
showing negative price drift.  
My findings highlight the importance of recognizing investment horizon of 
institutional investors as a dimension of institutional investors’ heterogeneity, and understanding 
various analysts’ behaviors according to this dimension can give implications for regulators and 
investors. First, not all institutions are the same and not all of them act as a predator for sell-side 
analysts. Therefore, it might be efficient for regulators to focus on the relations between short-
term institutional investors and sell-side brokerage firms when they try to identify and mitigate 
conflicts of interests of sell-side analysts. Second, investors need to be more careful when 
interpreting favorable sell-side analysts’ opinion if it is preceded the ownership change of short-
term institutional investors. 
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Figure 1. Sequence of events  
  
 
Table 1. Variable Definitions 
Variable  Definition 
Dependent variable: TP Accuracy Measure 
TPE_rev 
The difference between the target price, TP, and the stock price on the subsequent TP 
revision date, Prev, scaled by the stock price at the TP issue date, Ps.  
Independent variable: Institutional Investors' Investment Horizon Measure 
TII 
The ownership percentage of transient institutional investors on firm i measured at the 
end of quarter q-1. 
DED 
The ownership percentage of dedicated institutional investors on firm i measured at the 
end of quarter q-1. 
QUS 
The ownership percentage of quasi-indexing institutional investors on firm i measured at 
the end of quarter q-1. 
Independent variable: Covered Firm Characteristics 
MV Firm market capitalization measured at the TP issue date and expressed in USD millions. 
F_#Ana 
The number of analysts issuing at least one EPS forecast for the firm over the previous 
12 months. 
MOM Buy-and-hold stock returns for 3 months prior to the TP issue date. 
VOL Stock return standard deviation over 3 months prior to the TP issue date. 
TURN 
Average daily stock turnover (trading volume divided by outstanding number of shares) 
3 months prior to the TP issue date. 
ROA Net income of quarter q-1 divided by total assets at the end of the quarter 
Loss 
An indicator variable that equals 1 if net income of quarter q-1 is negative, and 0 
otherwise. 
LEV Total liability divided by total assets, measured at the end of quarter q-1. 
MTB 
Market value of equity divided by book value of equity, measure at the end of quarter q-
1. 
Independent variable: Analyst and Broker Characteristics 
A_exp 
The number of years that an analyst j has issued at least one EPS forecast for a given 
firm. 
A_cover 
The number of companies for which an analyst j issued at least one EPS forecast over 
the previous 12 months. 
B_#Ana 
The number of analysts at the brokerage house that issued at least one EPS forecasts in 
the previous 6 months. 
Independent variable: Other controls 
Fin_cris 
An indicator variable that equals 1 if the forecast is issued after September 1, 2007, and 
0 otherwise. 
The table presents the definitions of the main variables used in the study. I divided the variables into five 
categories: (1) TP accuracy measure, (2) institutional investors' investment horizon measure, (3) covered 
firm characteristics, (4) analyst and broker characteristics, and (5) other control variables.  
  




Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for Main Variables 
  n Mean Median Q1 Q3 Std Dev
TPE_rev 206,285 0.14 0.10 -0.04 0.29 0.30 
TII (%) 206,285 0.17 0.16 0.11 0.23 0.08 
DED (%) 206,285 0.08 0.07 0.03 0.12 0.06 
QUS (%) 206,285 0.47 0.49 0.40 0.57 0.14 
MV (USDm) 206,285 11,090 3,970 1,395 12,431 19,111 
F_#Ana 206,285 13.28 12.00 7.00 18.00 7.71 
MOM 206,285 0.05 0.05 -0.09 0.18 0.22 
VOL 206,285 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.01 
TURN 206,285 12.03 9.88 6.37 15.36 8.17 
ROA 206,285 0.14 0.14 0.07 0.22 0.21 
LEV 206,285 3.25 2.11 1.57 3.15 3.17 
MTB 206,285 3.14 2.39 1.53 3.80 2.65 
A_exp (year) 206,285 3.18 2.27 0.78 4.84 2.98 
A_cover  206,285 16.42 16.00 12.00 21.00 7.39 
B_#Ana 206,285 60.84 46.00 22.00 96.00 48.07 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for main variables. The definitions of variables are summarized in 
Table 1. 




Table 3. Pearson/Spearman Correlation Matrix for Main Variables 
  TPE_rev TII DED QUS lnMV lnF_#Ana MOM VOL TURN ROA LEV MTB A_exp A_cover  B_#Ana 
TPE_rev 
 
0.049*** 0.01*** -0.045*** 0.023*** -0.011*** -0.207*** 0.159*** 0.07*** -0.05*** -0.038*** -0.029*** -0.023*** -0.013*** -0.046*** 
TII 0.041*** 
 
0.05*** 0.132*** -0.23*** 0.031*** 0.083*** 0.124*** 0.372*** -0.008*** -0.174*** 0.114*** -0.035*** 0.017*** -0.041*** 
DED 0.007*** 0.072*** 
 
0.05*** -0.002 0.072*** 0.034*** 0.02*** 0.078*** -0.032*** -0.08*** 0.097*** -0.021*** -0.002 0.009*** 
QUS -0.033*** 0.093*** 0.027*** 
 
0.022*** 0.135*** -0.042*** -0.096*** 0.014*** 0.027*** -0.057*** -0.038*** 0.153*** 0.1*** 0.008*** 
lnMV -0.001 -0.221*** 0.104*** 0.115*** 
 
0.426*** 0.01*** -0.177*** -0.102*** 0.135*** 0.066*** 0.151*** 0.102*** -0.015*** 0.064*** 
lnF_#Ana -0.003 0.048*** 0.114*** 0.129*** 0.637*** 
 
-0.021*** -0.074*** 0.3*** 0.057*** -0.018*** 0.067*** 0.163*** 0.029*** 0.036*** 
MOM -0.202*** 0.088*** 0.043*** -0.031*** 0.04*** -0.013*** 
 
-0.173*** -0.048*** 0.038*** -0.039*** 0.183*** -0.015*** -0.006*** -0.027*** 
VOL 0.147*** 0.176*** 0.026*** -0.097*** -0.336*** -0.079*** -0.164*** 
 
0.456*** -0.182*** -0.056*** -0.053*** -0.091*** -0.031*** -0.061*** 
TURN 0.078*** 0.444*** 0.09*** 0.093*** -0.012*** 0.353*** -0.063*** 0.504*** 
 
-0.062*** -0.127*** 0.018*** 0.009*** -0.032*** -0.003 
ROA -0.041*** -0.008*** -0.004* 0.018*** 0.277*** 0.087*** 0.065*** -0.202*** -0.053*** 
 
0.003 0.334*** 0.04*** -0.008*** 0.045*** 
LEV -0.041*** -0.161*** -0.059*** -0.037*** 0.139*** -0.033*** -0.022*** -0.199*** -0.197*** 0.048*** 
 
-0.067*** 0.021*** 0.083*** 0.009*** 
MTB -0.04*** 0.119*** 0.143*** -0.028*** 0.232*** 0.094*** 0.229*** -0.104*** 0.001 0.487*** -0.155*** 
 
-0.049*** -0.037*** 0.006*** 
A_exp -0.013*** -0.029*** -0.002 0.146*** 0.173*** 0.171*** -0.012*** -0.096*** 0.035*** 0.045*** 0.054*** -0.041*** 
 
0.189*** 0.064*** 
A_cover  -0.013*** 0.026*** -0.005** 0.092*** 0.003 0.027*** -0.007*** -0.037*** -0.009*** -0.005** 0.097*** -0.035*** 0.233*** 
 
0.096*** 
B_#Ana -0.054*** -0.04*** 0.018*** 0.03*** 0.18*** 0.059*** -0.029*** -0.074*** -0.006*** 0.067*** 0.095*** 0.01*** 0.075*** 0.139***   
Table 3 shows Pearson and Spearman rank correlations between the main variables. Definitions of variables are in Table 1. Numbers of observations used in the correlation 
matrix is 158,473. Pearson correlations are reported above the main diagonal and Spearman correlations are reported below the diagonal. *** (**) (*) indicates significance ate 
1% (5%) (10%) two-tailed level.









 Change Analyses 
(∆TPE_rev) 
  (1) (2)    (3) (4) 
TII β1 0.198*** 0.275***  




 (6.50) (7.75) 
DED β2 0.044 -0.029  




 (-2.04) (0.92) 
QUS β3 -0.055** -0.074***  




 (1.10) (0.43) 
lnMV β4 0.000*** 0.000***  




 (63.34) (65.38) 
lnF_#Ana β5 -0.016*** -0.009  




 (-1.96) (-1.21) 
MOM β6 -0.241*** -0.195***  




 (-15.87) (-13.64) 
VOL β7 4.317*** 1.563***  




 (6.43) (-2.25) 
TURN β8 -0.000 0.000  




 (2.88) (1.00) 
ROA β9 -0.015 -0.034**  




 (2.05) (2.24) 
LOSS β10 0.025*** 0.025***  




 (0.17) (0.24) 
LEV β11 -0.003*** 0.000  




 (-1.94) (-2.12) 
MTB β12 -0.002 -0.001  




 (2.96) (0.96) 
lnA_exp β13 0.001 0.005**  




 (0.96) (1.78) 
lnA_cover β14 0.001 -0.005  




 (-0.02) (0.02) 
lnB_#Ana β15 -0.016*** -0.018***  




 (-11.72) (-4.03) 













(5.11) (9.57)        
Observations  206,285 206,285   
 
 165,384 165,384 
Adj. R-squared 0.097 0.148 
  





 no yes 
Year FE  no yes      no yes 
The table reports the OLS regression results on the effect of the investment horizon of institutional investors on 
the TP accuracy of sell-side analysts. Column (1) and (2) presents coefficient estimates from the analyst TP 
accuracy regression in equation (1), and column (3) and (4) shows the coefficient estimates from the regression 
in equation (2). P-values based on robust standard error clustered by covered stock are reported in brackets 
(Peterson, 2009). Significance at 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 




Table 5. Controlling for Reverse Causality 
Dependent variable  ∆ TPE_rev 
∆ TII γ1 1.673*** 
 
 (3.67) 
∆ DED γ2 0.670 
 
 (0.97) 
∆ QUS γ3 -0.361 
 
 (-0.71) 
∆ lnMV γ4 0.000* 
 
 (1.66) 
∆ lnF_#Ana γ5 0.078 
 (1.26) 
∆ MOM γ6 0.001 
 (0.02) 
∆ VOL γ7 -5.326 
 
 (-1.56) 
∆ TURN γ8 0.010 
 (1.36) 
∆ ROA γ9 0.081 
 (0.51) 
∆ LEV γ10 0.005 
 
 (0.24) 
∆ MTB γ11 0.009 
 (0.52) 
∆ lnA_exp γ12 -0.197 
 (-1.33) 
∆ lnA_cover γ13 0.109 
 
 (1.14) 
∆ lnB_#Ana γ14 -0.040 
 
 (-0.35) 
Constant γ0 0.049 
 
 (0.74) 
Observations  319 
Adjusted R-squared  0.168 
Industry FE  yes 
Year FE  yes 
The table shows the coefficient estimates from the analyst TP accuracy regressions in equation (3). P-values 
based on robust standard error clustered by covered stock are reported in brackets (Peterson, 2009). Significance 
at 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
  




Table 6. Short-term and Long-term Cumulative Abnormal Returns upon the Sell-side Analyst 
TP Revisions  
  (1) (2) (3)
  3-day abnormal return 3-month BHAR 6-month BHAR
UP δ1 0.030*** 0.030*** 0.096***
 (18.64) (7.34) (16.48)
REIT δ2 0.009*** 0.013*** 0.076***
 (4.83) (2.75) (11.50)
DOWN δ3 -0.005*** 0.006 0.074***
 (-3.20) (1.54) (12.90)
UP*∆TII δ4 -0.042*** -0.171*** -0.176***
 (-5.89) (-9.60) (-7.01)
REIT*∆TII δ5 -0.037 -0.013 -0.182*
 (-1.26) (-0.18) (-1.76)
DOWN*∆TII δ6 0.028*** -0.048*** -0.078***
 (4.66) (-3.16) (-3.65)
UP*∆DED δ7 -0.017 0.008 0.059
 (-1.60) (0.30) (1.59)
REIT*∆DED δ8 0.101** -0.084 -0.074
 (2.53) (-0.84) (-0.52)
DOWN*∆DED δ9 0.025*** -0.008 -0.075**
 (2.93) (-0.37) (-2.49)
UP*∆QUS δ10 0.030*** 0.084*** -0.007
 (5.02) (5.58) (-0.32)
REIT*∆QUS δ11 -0.008 -0.087 -0.040
 (-0.31) (-1.42) (-0.45)
DOWN*∆QUS δ12 -0.024*** -0.018* -0.005
 (-5.70) (-1.66) (-0.31)
Observations  197,977 197,977 197,977
Adj. R-squared  0.063 0.023 0.030
Industry FE  yes yes yes
Year FE  yes yes yes
The table shows the coefficient estimates from the analyst TP accuracy regressions in regression model (4). 
Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is indicated by *, **, and ***, respectively. 
  




Table 7. Calendar Time Regressions 
  Intercept RMRF SMB HML UMD Adj. R2 
TP upward revisions       
All TP upward revisions 0.241  1.080  0.288 0.292 0.064 86.6% 
 
(4.697) (86.503) (17.221) (18.387) (6.810) 
 
Most largest TII % increases (high) -0.012 1.229  0.419 0.159 0.056 88.9% 
 
(-0.067) (29.420) (7.698) (2.976) (1.766) 
 
Most largest TII % decreases (low) 0.559  1.123  0.425 0.260 0.021 83.3% 
 
(2.756) (22.803) (6.617) (4.115) (0.567) 
 
TP reiterations 
      
All TP reiterations 0.088  1.020  0.325 0.295 -0.067 88.0% 
 
(0.940) (42.428) (8.911) (8.993) (-3.618) 
 
Most largest TII % increases (high) 0.140  1.006  0.460 0.264 0.001 87.1% 
 
(0.823) (22.730) (6.226) (4.302) (0.032) 
 
Most largest TII % decreases (low) 0.107  1.056  0.337 0.183 -0.143 90.4% 
 
(0.707) (25.184) (4.943) (3.040) (-4.525) 
 
TP downward revisions 
      
All TP downward revisions 0.136  1.091  0.278 0.271 -0.238 86.0% 
 
(2.199) (71.018) (13.845) (13.449) (-19.991) 
 
Most largest TII % increase (high) -0.006  1.182  0.439 0.312 -0.353 86.1% 
 
(-0.027) (19.919) (5.779) (4.069) (-7.897) 
 
Most largest TII % decrease (low) 0.091  1.245  0.417 0.078 -0.272 88.3% 
  (0.392) (20.722) (5.532) (0.985) (-5.585)  
Portfolios are formed by including all TP issuances/revisions that were announced within the previous six 
months. The portfolios’ equally weighted monthly returns, in excess of the risk-free rate, are regressed on the 
following four factors: RMRF, the excess return on the value-weighted market portfolio; SMB, the return on a 
zero investment portfolio formed by subtracting the return on a large firm portfolio from the return on a small 
firm portfolio; HML, the return on a portfolio of high book-to-market stocks less the return on a portfolio of low 
book-to-market stocks; and UMD, formed by taking the return on high momentum stocks minus the return on 
low momentum stocks. I report regression results from portfolios classified by TP upward revisions, reiterations, 
and downward revisions. I form decile (tercile) portfolios for TP upward/downward revisions (reiterations) 
based on the magnitude of the previous ownership changes of transient institutional investors on the covered 
stock, which then I regress on the four factors. For example, conditional on TP upward revisions, I construct a 
portfolio that includes firms whose target price issuance/revision occurred within the previous six months and 
was in the top and bottom decile of recent transient institutional ownership changes at the time of TP was 
announced.  
  





본 연 는 미  주식시 에  투 들  투 간  애널리스트 주가  정확
에 향  미치는지 여  하 다. 특 , 애널리스트가 단  투 가 보 한 
주식에 하여 주가 정확  포 하는 가  하 는 , 는 단  투  
수  단  주가에 민감하고 라  현 주가  높게 지하  해 애널리스트에게 압
 행사할 것  상하  문 다. 1999년 터 2013년 동안 뮤 얼 드  주식보
현황과 애널리스트 주가 료  하여 연 한 결과, 애널리스트  주가 
차는 단  투  지  가함에 라 가하지만,  투  지
과는 미한 계가 없  견하 다. 또한 시  단  투  매수 후에 
 애널리스트 주가 상향조정에 상 적   함 , 애널리스트 주
가  편향  주가에  함  견하 다. 그럼에도 하고, 전 적  시  
애널리스트  주가 상향조정에 과  보 고 차후 수 달에 걸쳐    
수정하 다. 라 , 본 연  실  애널리스트가 투 간에 라 질적  
 투  집단  별하고  집단에 라 별적  행동함  시사한다. 
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